This paper operates under the premise that conflicts over internet usage have arisen and escalated in a manner that is as coevolutionary as an arms race. 5 For example, as individuals have discovered ways to exchange information in a way that circumvents property rights like copyright, enforcement officials have discovered tactics to limit or frustrate such activity. In response, the infringers have complicated their methods. Russia's implementation of DPI may succeed in the laudable goal of stopping the spread of child pornography or sex trafficking.
However, it is possible that this program is actually a domestic spying program merely masquerading as a crime-fighting tool. It is also possible that DPI may begin with the goal of combatting child pornography, but its mission may ultimately expand to serve innumerable other investigatory purposes, including but not limited to investigations into political dissidence, independent journalism, or copyright infringement. Before proceeding further, a disclaimer should be issued. While the remainder of this article discusses what steps are likely to be taken by what content creators and others refer to as 'sophisticated pirates,' this article's premise is that with each development in the realm of enforcement, the interconnected and equalizing nature of the internet has provided access to productive lines of flight that escape the very scheme that it was meant to reign in. Even though this article does not take a stance on the ethics of piracy or copyright enforcement, any extended discussion on this issue is bound to bring up tactics that circumvent or frustrate the purposes of programs such as the CAS. In discussing these developments, it is worth remembering that the tactics discussed herein are benign tools that are capable of innovation or infringement, depending solely upon the circumstances under which they are wielded. The author does not seek to implicitly condone or excuse such uses but believes that the discussion of these alternatives illustrates fundamental shortcomings of the CAS.
This article will first discuss the framers, structure, and historical context of the CAS.
Discussion will then turn to the underlying axioms of programs like the CAS and their effects on the infrastructure of the internet and its users. Finally, in discussing the shortcomings of CAS' current implementation, this article will examine several mitigating procedures likely to be used to circumvent the CAS in the future, rendering it functionally irrelevant as an innovative copyright enforcement mechanism. This ineffectiveness is argued to be exemplary of the coevolutionary nature of this conflict between piracy and enforcement, but also calls into questions the premises its framers operated under in an attempt to putatively protect their interests.
THE COPYRIGHT ALERT SYSTEM
Beginning in early 2013, 7 some internet users in the United States will receive a message from their internet service providers (ISP's). 8 This message will politely inform them that a user on their network is believed to have infringed upon a copyright, and that such an infringement violates the ISP's acceptable use policy. It will also notify the user about the serious consequences of copyright infringement should such behavior continue. The ISP will inform the user that the message constitutes their first warning of the consequences of such behavior on their network, and it will list possible ways to avoid future offenses by directing the user to a variety of lawful media content sites.
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The ISP will continue to send this notice to the user should it be notified that copyright infringement has allegedly been committed again from the same internet account. This second notice will be almost identical to the first. Should the ISP continue to receive allegations of copyright infringement from a variety of unnamed content creators, a third and fourth notice will be sent. This notice will request the internet account subscriber to "acknowledge receipt" of the messages by clicking on a notice that will redirect the subscriber to educational resources on copyright infringement and its serious consequences. 10 If the ISP receives information that the subscriber continues to commit 'infringing behavior,' the Copyright Alert System (CAS) allows for ISPs to send enhanced alerts that 'mitigation measures' will follow. 11 The form and extent of 14 "These mitigation measures will vary by ISP and range from requiring the subscriber to review educational materials, to a temporary slow-down of Internet access speed. However, termination of a consumer's Internet service is not a part of any ISP's Copyright Alert System program. Contrary to many erroneous reports, this is not a "six-strikes-and-you're-out" system that would result in termination. There's no "strikeout" in this program." (emphasis removed Under SOPA, upon the issuance of a notice and intent to proceed by the Attorney General, a court may issue either: a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction, or an injunction against the allegedly infringing website. 24 Having only received an application from the Attorney General, and within 5 days of that application having been granted, all of the advertising networks, payment facilities and/or hosting services would have to grant the injunction without any further hearing or notice to the alleged infringer.
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Since Congress failed to enact either piece of legislation, the lobbying groups representing American content creators turned to policy solutions that would require as little legislative or judicial oversight as possible. To this end, lobbyists for copyright owners had been collaborating with America's five largest ISPs to form the CCI in September 2011, 26 which was based on a memorandum of understanding signed between its members in July of 2011.
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The production of the CCI went hand-in-hand with its parties' lobbying efforts for legislation, as it was created while SOPA and PIPA had a greater chance of passage and well before the proposed legislation faced public backlash. Consequently, it is apparent that the policy directives reflected in the CAS are a part of what was intended to be a much more multifaceted and complementary approach. They are not simply a one-shot response to the lobby's failure to effectively push for legislation.
BITTORRENT TRAFFIC AND YOU
The CAS most hopes to affect the traffic between users downloading infringing material. the torrent file. For example, when a peer finishes downloading a piece and checks its integrity against the index, it announces that it has that piece to all of its peers (the BitTorrent "swarm"), which decentralizes the demand for a particular piece of a file by allowing subsequent requests for that piece to be routed to either the original source or any user in the swarm who has announced they have it. 33 This decentralization has advantages, but in order to more effectively manage the bandwidth being used by the swarm to exchange the file, the Internet Protocol (IP)
address of each user in the swarm is revealed. 34 This identifying information may then be used to track the internet service provider that hosts that IP address and the subscriber to whom it was assigned.
SIX STRIKES AND YOU'RE THROTTLED
The pending implementation scheme of each ISP pursuant to their partnership with the CCI of the Six Strike CAS system has already been described at length in this article, 35 and need not be restated. While analysis of the CAS is in its relative infancy due to its pending status and genesis as a privately negotiated agreement, rather than a publicly debated piece of legislation, early appraisals of the CAS's public interest implications are less than glowing. 36 The CAS grapples with the norms of freedom of expression, privacy, fairness, proportionality, and 32 Id. 33 Id. 34 Id. 35 See supra text accompanying notes 8-16. 36 See generally Bridy, supra note 27.
transparency. 37 In particular, the private origins of CAS present a fundamental problem for the public interest, as Bridy notes:
Although the same concerns are raised by publicly administered protocols like Hadopi, the private nature of CAS [Copyright Alert System] means that there will be no public forum for debate over the terms of the MOU [Memorandum of Understanding] or the procedures and sanctions it prescribes. CAS was presented to the public as a fait accompli and will be offered for the public's assent as a contract of adhesion for broadband service. There will be, in other words, no bargaining about it. Some people will be able to choose a non-party ISP and thereby avoid being subject to CAS, but many (if not most) will not have that option given the state of the market for residential broadband service and the size and reach of the ISPs participating in the MOU. CAS will be the law for millions of U.S. broadband subscribers, whether they like it or not. As with the Eircom protocol, because there is no state action involved, there will be no judicial review of the constitutionality of the MOU's provisions. The CCI advisory board, whose members were not even appointed until after negotiations over the substance of CAS were closed, is the public's only advocate within the CAS governance structure, yet it had no role in the design of the protocol and is not empowered to make recommendations about implementation that bind the CCI executive committee.
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While Bridy concluded that the public interest assessment of the CAS revealed the Six Strike System to be a decidedly mixed bag for ISP subscribers, this article focuses on the likely extralegal responses that the CAS necessitates by those whose actions suggest that reform, and not education, is needed to combat copyright infringement.
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The CAS complements a tactic utilized by the MPAA in setting up torrent files of its intellectual property as 'honey pots,' which monitor BitTorrent swarms that are used to pull infringing material from a multitude of sources and assemble them at the user's computer. 40 IP 37 Id. at 25. 38 Id. 39 See Cory Doctorow, Accused of infringement? AT&T will take away YouTube and Facebook and send you to Copyright Reeducation Gulag, BOINGBOING (Oct. 14, 2012), http://boingboing.net/2012/10/14/accused-ofinfringement-att.html (depicting leaked training documents from AT&T -suggesting that limited access to or redirection from "popular sites" such as Google or Youtube will be the primary vehicle of "re-education efforts," which is problematic in assuming without any meaningful warrant the premise that it is simply a lack of awareness that causes individuals to infringe). 40 sustain a copyright infringement suit the CAS may become a primary avenue for accomplishing the same goals of deterrence that an infringement lawsuit represents. However, the remedy available to the aggrieved content creator would be substantially limited by comparison, or it would require further monitoring resources to effectuate the same ends.
SUPPRESSION OF ALTERNATIVES AS DISCIPLINARY POWER: SURVEILLANCE AS CONTROL
The CAS is also being implemented against a backdrop of governmental copyright enforcement as exemplified by the ongoing program, 'Operation In Our Sites.' 44 The National
Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center, managed by the Department of Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) Homeland Security Investigations arm, is complementing the CAS approach by targeting websites and their operators that it believes are distributing counterfeit and pirated items over the internet. 45 While its success and methods have been controversial and sometimes misapplied, 46 'Operation In Our Sites' has resulted in the seizure of 758 top-level domains and nearly $900,000. 47 However, of these 758 domains, only seven have been engaged in the sale of counterfeit goods, suggesting that ICE has primarily focused on copyright enforcement of intellectual property. 48 In response, some sites that maintain top-level domains (TLD), 49 managed by the American-based Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), have attempted to circumvent ICE's jurisdiction by re-registering with country code top-level domain (ccTLD) names for countries, such as Sweden which are outside the control of U.S. Corporations such as ICAAN. 50 While ICE's approach has enjoyed some success in shuttering domains, it is an incomplete effort given that the internet's infrastructure enables individuals to easily set up the same infringement facilitating material through proxies.
ICE has essentially been engaged in a jurisdictional exercise of "whack-a-mole" because for each TLD it takes down a ccTLD may take its place in a jurisdiction beyond its authority.
However, if content creators are able to limit access by forwarding information on facilitators of infringement to ICE for Operation In Our Sites while simultaneously policing subscribers to the five largest ISPs in America, then these subscribers would find it difficult (although maybe feasible) to subscribe to a non-CAS ISP. By suppressing meaningful alternatives, a broad enforcement scheme for policing the periphery of the internet becomes a plausible reality for extinguishing the exchange of speech or data in general. A key feature of such a scheme lies in its claimed capability to continuously surveil a user's internet traffic in such a way that the user cannot ascertain when or if he or she is even being monitored.
Resultantly, such a scheme would force the subscribers to act fearfully as if they are always under surveillance. 51 An incidental complication of the DPI utilized by the Russian government as well as surveillance procedures that are preferred by the CAS is that all traffic for all subscribers must be scrutinized at all times in order for the scheme to be most effective. Public knowledge or even suspicions of such a capability is imbued with the insidious power of "creating an environment of pervasive and invisible surveillance" 52 that mirrors developments in penal systems, educational experiments and dictatorships alike: sometimes just knowing you are always being watched is enough to coerce compliance from citizens. The sovereign's interest in this setting is the same whether the sovereign is represented for example by a democratically elected government, a prison warden or a vicious dictator: the efficiency of control. 53 This control can only be perfected by simultaneously policing the periphery and limiting the alternatives to being surveilled that may be available to the citizenry. ICE's tactics, as lobbied for by content creators, completes this loop, and allows the economic and practical suppression of infringement as well as other ancillary activities that do not actually constitute infringement. 54 Already, the use of remedies available to content creators under the DMCA often result in collateral damage to parties availing themselves of potentially infringing material under the parameters of fair use.
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The implementation of CAS would attempt to further this suppression, which is particularly interesting given the failure of private suits as a remedy against infringing activity to stem the use of BitTorrent protocols even in cases where monitoring similar to DPI is available to the ISP. 
PIRATES ARE GOING TO PIRATE: THE CAS JUST FORCES FLIGHT TO ALTERNATIVES
In all likelihood, monitoring by copyright holders and ISPs will generate a community response. One such response will be the use of remote access to machines in jurisdictions beyond the United States. Such an action would enable individuals to infringe without presenting any meaningful recourse to American copyrights enforcement agencies. Under this paradigm, remote servers in jurisdictions, such as the Netherlands, are remotely accessed and host infringing content through a BitTorrent "swarm", that is, a multitude of different machines that are simultaneously accessing, hosting, and assembling the infringing content in pieces according to a set of instructions included with the torrent file. Because of the structure of the remote access, the last entities perceived as having received and assembled the infringing material via torrent to parties monitoring the swarm as part of a copyright enforcement scheme are left with the identifying information of the foreign server, not the domestic IP address that ordered it to access the infringing content.
Such a "private dedicated server" is called a Seedbox. 57 Numerous Seedbox features would allow infringing parties to skirt the measures promulgated by the CCI and the ISPs that have signed onto the Six-Strike System. An additional benefit to the use of a Seedbox is that there are minimal technical barriers to utilizing a foreign server as a seedbox. 58 The support structure of Seedboxes varies, but a plethora of providers have proliferated with the advertisement and the proposed implementation of the CAS. Many of these providers existed prior to any discussion of American implementation of such a system because foreign jurisdictions' implementation of similar or more draconian measures have created a demand for such services. 59 In addition to the use of a server in another jurisdiction, sophisticated users may also avail themselves of the services of a Virtual Private Network (VPN) in order to circumvent the surveillance protocols used by their ISP. 60 VPNs enable data encryption as well as the routing of said data through a remote host before it is transferred to the client computer. 61 Many seedbox providers also provide VPN services as a bundle in conjunction with a remote host that manages the bandwidth used to actually obtain infringing material using BitTorrent technology. A VPN is commonly used in corporate environments because of its encryption methods and its ease of access. A VPN is a popular option in the corporate world when employees or clients remotely require resources but do not wish to use a communication method that can be easily eavesdropped upon. The only limitation on use of a VPN to obtain infringing material is whether a 'private tracker' 62 permits a connection over a VPN (many private trackers prohibit such a connection as part of their network infrastructure). 63 Circumventing the encryption between a client computer and its host using a VPN is challenging and of questionable legal status, depending on the circumstances. Cracking such encryption while a subscriber uses their file-transfer protocol to connect to and download from a remote host would be incredibly inefficient. Additionally, it would be statutorily barred except in the matters related to an active criminal investigation. These already significant considerations are multiplied when considered in an international setting.
CUI BONO: HOW WILL CONTENT CREATORS DEAL WITH THIS ESCALATION?
CAS implementation and the accompanying shift of large-scale content creators from mass-IP lawsuits to an extrajudicial disciplinary approach may have ancillary trickle-down effects on content creators of a smaller import. However, whether those trickle-down effects will be beneficial remains to be seen and is indeed an unsubstantiated claim at best. 66 See Danaher & Waldfogel, supra note 16. The article acknowledges the fuzziness of any numerical analysis of piracy at the moment, but is still able to conclude statistically that piracy has an effect on international box office sales and international distribution. The finding is consistent with the suggestion that domestic piracy's direct effect on domestic box office numbers or domestic distribution (as a subset of total revenue generated by a given intellectual property) is attenuated, ambiguous and does not warrant a policy intervention absent further study that isn't being initiated on behalf of the industry itself. 67 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
will likely continue to hamper efforts and innovation absent a legislative rebuke or redirection from Congress. It seems that we have arrived at an impasse where even the nonprofit entities supporting smaller content creators are in limbo amidst a hydra-like system of enforcement that has a laudable goal, but may have bitten off much more than can be chewed. This is particularly true if the response from the Internet Community is simply to alter its behavior and become more sophisticated, even as the methods of acquisition of infringing material proliferate beyond the borders of the authorities so desperate to curtail it.
Copyright enforcement entities have attempted to manage digital rights with limited success. Furthermore, they have attempted to deter individuals with the threats of unimaginably high financial penalties for infringing behavior. Neither of these tactics nor their predecessors have meaningfully stemmed the exchange of infringing material. It is unlikely that such unrestricted surveillance will enjoy any greater success, but it may very well affect other principles of the internet in a way that is unforeseeable, uncertain and unfortunately undemocratic. 68 While the CAS is certainly not the last shot in the escalating conflict between infringing entities and copyright enforcement, one would hope that its lack of transparency and arguably insufficient consumer safeguards 69 will gradually be addressed in a public manner in the future. 68 "The technology appears to be 'just the way things are'; its origins are concealed, whether those origins lie in state-sponsored scheme or market-structured order, and its effects are obscured because it is hard to imagine the alternative. Above all, technical solutions are less contentious; we think of a legal regime as coercing, and a technological regime as merely shaping --or even actively facilitating --our choices." Boyle, supra note 53, at 205. 69 See Bridy, supra note 27.
